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Network industries in the
new economy
In this paper we discuss two propositions: the supply
and demand of knowledge, and network externalities.
We outline the characteristics that distinguish know-
ledge-intensive industries from the general run of
manufacturing and service businesses. Knowledge
intensity and knowledge specialisation has developed
as markets and globalisation have grown, leading to
progressive incentives to outsource and for industries
to deconstruct. The outcome has been more intensive
competition. The paper looks at what is potentially
the most powerful economic mechanism: positive
feedback, alternatively known as demand-side
increasing returns, network effects, or network exter-
nalities. We present alternative demand curves that
incorporate positive feedback and discuss their poten-
tial economic and strategic consequences. We argue
that knowledge supply and demand, and the dynam-
ics of network externalities create new situations for
our traditional industrial economy such that new
types of economies of scale are emerging and ‘winner
takes all’ strategies are having more influence.
This is the first of a pair of papers. A second
paper will take the argument further and look at the
nature of firms’ strategies in the new world, arguing
that technology standards, technical platforms, con-
sumer networks, and supply chain strategies are
making a significant contribution to relevant strate-
gies within the new economy.
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Introduction
The popular business and financial press has pro-
duced endless discussions of the high-tech industries,
the dot.com revolution, and the ‘new economy’. The
academic literature in turn has seen much discussion
of ‘increasing returns’ and ‘positive feedback effects’,
especially since Arthur’s two seminal papers in 1989
and 1990. With the bursting of the dot.com bubble
and apparent overselling of high-tech stocks, partic-
ularly telecommunications stocks, it may seem that a
high-technology bubble has been and gone and that
normal times have returned and we can revert to
normal economics. This paper argues that this is too
simplistic a view and too sanguine by half. We argue
first that knowledge-intensive industries are a fact of
life and that their economic characteristics have sig-
nificant and enduring implications. We acknowledge
that microelectronics has had a powerful impact on
the nature of competition through commoditisation
of products and innovation in distribution channels.
However, the more powerful strategic impact has to
be seen through the new industry structures now evi-
dent in the supply chains that run from
telecommunications through to new dot.com com-
panies. We put knowledge intensity and the new
industries alongside the notion of positive feedback
effects to argue that this is the platform from which
major new competitive forces are emerging. These sit
alongside traditional industry structures but also con-
tain important new strategic lessons. It is from this
vantage point that we can observe a new strategic
logic at work that requires new approaches to the
analysis of industries, a different and novel concep-
tion of generic strategies, and new ways of
strategising in companies. This is not entirely new.
The idea of positive feedback effects and increasing
returns has been around for decades. However, its
effects have been seen as derived from the supply-
side increasing returns and natural monopoly
characteristics of traditional industries. It is the con-
junction of these effects with knowledge
specialisation and knowledge intensity that marks a
distinctive change. 
This paper discusses the supply and demand of
knowledge and network externalities. We argue that
these two factors create new situations for our tradi-
tional industrial economy (the old economy) such that
© European Business Journal 2002
new types of economies of scale are emerging and
‘winner takes all’ strategies are becoming prevalent. 
Our second companion paper will take the argu-
ment further and look at the nature of firms’
strategies in the new world (the new economy),
arguing that attention to technology standards,
technical platforms, consumer networks, and supply
chain strategies have created a significant contribu-
tion to new strategies within the new economy. 
Knowledge economics in the network
economy
In the past fifty years, the world has witnessed the
rise of information and communication technolo-
gies (ICT). It has changed the nature of the
commercial environment and has increased the
speed of operation, driven by the increase in con-
nectivity between companies, and between
companies and their customers. Network industries,
such as telecommunications, the Internet, comput-
ing and software, have had a significant role in
shaping the corporate environment into a new net-
work economy. (The structure and nature of
network industries and the network economy is dis-
cussed in our second paper.) 
Do the same economic ‘laws’ hold for the new
network economy as for the traditional industrial
economy? This question has attracted much atten-
tion in business and in academia. The popular press
has been excited by the possibility of a New World
in which the old economics is somehow stood on its
head. Academic economists have generally been
more cautious. Shapiro and Varian (1999) in their
excellent book on the information economy recog-
nise these dynamics but assert ‘Technology changes.
Economic laws do not.’ The impact of the Internet
and computer networks nevertheless has created a
new type of market failure driven by technology,
high-risk network externalities (discussed later on),
and zero marginal costs (Dumont, 2000). 
We are witnessing a new commercial scenario:
networks no longer belong to a single firm. Strategy
goes beyond the efficient use of network structure
and the relevant allocation of cost. Collaboration
between firms has become mandatory for intra-net-
work compatibility, a feature that is crucial in
telecommunications. Collaboration and anti-
monopoly pressures have led to a shift towards
fragmented ownership and oligopolistic circum-
stances. Underpinning networks and the growth of
collaboration are the following well-known charac-
teristics of information goods, such as digitised
information as in recorded music, software, football
scores, encyclopaedias and telephone directories:
1. High fixed costs but low to vanishing marginal
costs, thus high costs of creating intellectual
property, but low costs of reproduction.
2. Low costs of copying intellectual property.
3. Information is an experience good every time it
is consumed.
4. With easy access to information, there is infor-
mation overload – value arises from location,
filtering and communicating what is useful.
Search engines facilitate this.
5. An extensive, expensive technology infrastruc-
ture is required to produce and distribute
information.
6. Pricing is value-based, rather than cost-based.
However, these characteristics on their own do not
produce exceptional results. They do result in an
emphasis on volume and a tendency in certain cir-
cumstances, for example in fragmented markets, for
price to fall precipitously towards marginal cost, i.e.
to zero. But information products are susceptible to
differentiation to convey quality signals and
endorsement (e.g. the Encyclopaedia Britannica
name). Such products are customised through tim-
ing (e.g. Amazon’s mail shots through its
Permission Marketing programmes) or individual
customer data in the form of personalised web sites.
At the same time the low marginal cost characteris-
tics of information goods make it attractive to
create dedicated distribution channels for informa-
tion transfer (one-way or two-way) through which
information differentiation can also be attempted.
This differentiation has provided the basis for e-
commerce and the growth of the Internet. 
On the basis of these characteristics, there has
been a systematic and ever-increasing shift from the
traditional industrial economy to a knowledge-
based or information economy. The next section
outlines the basis for this evolution/revolution.
The demand and supply of knowledge
A key strategy in developing knowledge industries
is to create a capability to analyse an organisation’s
current knowledge-processing environment, both
on the ‘supply side’ of securing and providing exist-
ing knowledge and on the ‘demand side’ of
knowledge creation. The core of the knowledge
management challenge lies in creating a perfect
balance of knowledge supply and demand.
Google.com, the leading Internet search engine
NETWORK INDUSTRIES IN THE NEW ECONOMY 117
company, is an excellent example of this dynamic.
(For more details see the article by Fred Vogelstein
in Fortune, 27 May 2002.) The company’s founders,
Brin and Page, who left Stanford’s PhD programme
to start the company, recognised that a network
could be built from existing outsourced commodity
hardware. In this case, knowledge was extracted
from its original appropriators (server, software and
telecommunication companies), and diffused by
Google, who could bundle and replicate their
knowledge. More capital-intensive processes fol-
lowed simple replication of this kind. What came
next was the combination with other knowledge,
such as revenue earning advertising practices, to
assemble a new goods package that came to be
known as the Google market. 
As in Google’s case, an important point of
change in the new economy is that knowledge is
being made explicit, being appropriated by others,
being diffused and replicated, and is becoming
industrialised. Knowledge is produced in large vol-
umes at lower cost. External knowledge providers
(service companies such as IT, billing and consul-
tancy providers) are changing the nature of the
firm, as they provide a substitution for the tacit
knowledge base previously controlled by the firm.
The implication is that vertical integration and
diversification patterns will become unsustainable.
As knowledge changes, proprietary links give way
to market relationships under labels such as out-
sourcing, deconstruction and the hollowing-out of
the corporation.
As knowledge production has grown in response
to market growth over the past 25 years, it has
become more specialised and more diverse in its
sources. It has moved from being a cottage industry
to being an industrialised activity. Portions of
knowledge are originally produced and appropriat-
ed for use by individuals or individual firms. How
this outside knowledge is used and absorbed by a
company has become an important success factor.
Google’s flexible system, based on the knowledge of
several suppliers, reduced the risk of becoming out-
moded by rapid developments. Its knowledge
providers, or suppliers, handle the strain and
expense of technological change. Google managed
to build a business based on searches where Alta
Vista, Yahoo, Lycos, Excite and Infoseek had failed. 
Value chains: from integrated to reconstructed
networks
The serial decisions of ‘assembly’ versus the ‘pur-
chase’ of customised products, which is exemplified
by the Google case, reflect changing economic cir-
cumstances and shifts in relative costs. There has
been an extensive change in the nature of know-
ledge investment and production leading to a
further change in the supply and demand for know-
ledge. Quinn (2001) describes these pervasive
changes in six distinct phases. 
In the first phase, economies of scale are created
as large organisations capture key activities, leading
to the demise of smaller enterprises that lack capital
and expertise. In the second phase, economies of
scope come about as the same technologies that cre-
ated the economies of scale allow the handling of
more data, more output functions, or more cus-
tomers without corresponding cost increases.
However, changes in the fundamental condi-
tions of demand and supply of knowledge can lead
to the next phase – disintermediation.
Disintermediation is the process by which propri-
etary links within the firm give way to the
coordination mechanisms of markets. It refers to
the piecemeal replacement of internal activities by
external provision. Where this replacement is sys-
tematic and extensive it is known as deconstruction
– the process of systematically undermining funda-
mental concepts (in this case the logic of vertical
integration). Next, we enter a phase of deregulation
in  the sense that increased competition replaces
the regulation imposed through vertical integration
and semi-monopolistic competition. In this scen-
ario, new competitors with new knowledge make
cross-competition more possible.
Finally, there are rounds of redispersion and
redecentralisation due to a reassertion of the need
for more localised and personalised contact as new
forms of broking, selling, and agencies emerge. 
To summarise, the systematic accretion of
knowledge and its diffusion around the world has
had the effect of forcing a restructuring of industries
even to the extent that entire economies have been
fundamentally changed. The open standards and
the universal connectivity inherent in information
technology enable knowledge modules to be
‘snapped together’ similar to a Lego system, without
any expensive customisation or reworking.
With the widespread acceptance of internation-
al division of labour in knowledge, there are further
characteristics inherent in the new economy. The
first is that knowledge-based functions are signifi-
cant elements in most value chains and that these
are significant in size and critical for competitive
advantage. The second is that the pressures of com-
petition mean that simple technical efficiency is
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not enough. There are opportunity costs of not buy-
ing from the most efficient suppliers and
outsourcing becomes not only attractive but also
necessary. Third and most important, firms need to
focus their strategic investments and their manage-
ment attention on those knowledge-intensive
activities that form the basis for sustainable com-
petitive advantage. This means that it is no longer
sufficient to maintain a portfolio of competences in
which most of the competences are at best only co-
specialised with the core competences. Historically
firms have invested capital in those journeyman
competences that were required to bring the truly
distinctive assets, the core competences, to market.
Now, however, they do have the prospect of replac-
ing them with lower cost or more effective
substitutes from external suppliers. 
Through this mechanism we are witnessing the
development of three new business models: the new
competitor; the deconstructed value chain; and the
reconstructed value chain (Evans and Wurster,
2000).
The new competitor mounts direct attacks on
established businesses by splitting the information
flows from the physical flows. Thus, the success of
business hinges on two levels of transaction: the
traditional flow of products to the supply channels,
and the flow of information from the company to
the customer, via channels such as the Internet.
Figure 1 illustrates these two levels. 
In Amazon.com the business model is not simply
the replacement of an expensive shopping process
(for the customer) by cheap electronic means, but
also an approach of differentiation aimed at turning
a direct online bookseller into a virtual focal point. 
The approach of Egg in the UK to online finan-
cial services is much the same. The UK financial
services firm Prudential launched Egg in 1998 to
offer products and services in banking, investments,
insurance and online shopping. Egg is designed for
the Internet generation using the Internet as the
primary medium of consumer contact. It has a
strong focus on technology by combining the char-
acteristics of a conventional direct business with
automated customer relationship management.
In both the cases of Amazon and Egg, the very
high fixed costs of online selling are defrayed not just
by high volumes but also by the economies of scope
that follow from diversification channelled through
the online shopping point. Evans and Wurster (2000)
in their well-known book about deconstruction and
being ‘Blown to Bits’ make the same point with an
example about separating the information-rich part
from the commodity part of the value chain. 
The deconstruction model, in Figure 2, stems from
the need to focus the firm’s attention on those few,
typically knowledge-based activities that underpin
long-term competitive advantage. To do this the
firm has to redefine its remaining capabilities as
activities which can be bought in from ‘best-in-
class’ suppliers. This applies equally to overhead
‘services’ as much as it does elsewhere in the value
chain. In this way the firm becomes less vertically
integrated in the conventional way – it has to deny
the old saying that ‘what it does not own it cannot
control’. However, it does maintain its control of
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FIGURE 1: The new competitive model.
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the value chain and of the advantages accruing to
the customer by actively reinforcing the core com-
petences which it has retained (more on this below)
and by investing in the management of its outsourc-
ing so as to maintain its bargaining power with its
(new) suppliers and partners. 
In Figure 3 there is a battle for control in the
deconstructed model of the supply chain – a battle
for ownership and control of competitive advan-
tage. One mode of operation occurs when
integration gives way to orchestration. Successful
orchestrators possess powerful brands and other
core competences that give them competitive
advantage by virtue of which they can control the
terms of supply (Figure 3). Nike and Hewlett-
Packard are examples of this mode. The
orchestrators retain sufficient idiosyncratic capital
to preserve some degree of vertical integration suffi-
cient to exercise power throughout the supply
chain. But control over the supply chain depends
on the location of knowledge in the chain. 
Those players who focus on a specific value-
added step have incentives for scale and scope
effects with the possibility of wresting control from
the traditional integrated players (Figure 4). Intel
and Microsoft did this to IBM because IBM was not
able to control the IBM standard for PCs. 
Instead Intel’s microprocessor technology and
Microsoft’s software represented the key knowledge
assets which then dominated the supply chain. In
the extreme case, the integrated firms deconstruct
entirely with each value-added step in the supply
chain becoming a business in its own right.
Competition is then fragmented, products become
near-commodities, and economic rents are minimal
and transitory. 
The reconstruction model has two elements. The
first applies existing core competences into other
value chains to establish new economies of scale
there and in doing so creating new economies of
scope (Figure 5). 
This is familiar in that it replicates well-known
processes of related diversification. But it is differ-
ent in that it represents an attempt to dominate
other apparently related supply chains with existing
knowledge-based competences. In this process, the
nature of scope has changed from product-market
relatedness to knowledge (or resource) relatedness.
In this resource-based view of the corporate port-
folio, competition is as much a competition for
competences and for knowledge as its more familiar
application to products. Evans and Wurster have
dubbed this the ‘rewiring’ of the firm in which
knowledge-based competences have become the
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FIGURE 2: The deconstruction model: disintermediating.
controlling element in multiple supply chains
through several highly focused (i.e. short) value
chains (Figure 6). 
The second element is the creation of a new set
of corporate level capabilities whose purpose is to
identify and manage the set of collaborative rela-
tionships that make up the web of partners and
strategic suppliers. Indeed the vertical integration
metaphor of the value chain gives way to the lan-
guage of the value web (Figure 7). The centre of the
web contains the new corporate glue (idiosyncratic
knowledge) that maintains the new style of port-
folio positions across value chains and across
industries and orchestrates strategic linkages so as to
retain control over the traditional value chains.
The points of leverage for this core competence are
the specific knowledge-based assets that are applied
across different industries. In this new game compa-
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FIGURE 3: The deconstruction model: orchestrating downstream.
FIGURE 4: The deconstruction model: orchestrating upstream.
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nies can develop a much higher degree of focus in
applying their strategies through their knowledge-
based assets rather than through traditional product
market strategies. 
In general, the focus of strategic thinking has
shifted from domination of markets and of supply
chains through a vertically integrated set of activi-
ties to an assertion of leading positions in key
intellectual assets coupled with new thinking at the
corporate centre about knowledge management,
risk assessment, and the management of informa-
tion and knowledge. The focus has shifted from
products and product classes to activities, know-
ledge and competences.
Positive feedback in network 
industries
In this section we look at how the old industrial
economy was characterised by economies of scale
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FIGURE 5: The reconstruction model: knowledge transfer.
FIGURE 6: The reconstruction model: the composite new value chain.
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and scope, whilst the new information economy is
driven by the economics of positive feedback in
network industries. We will discuss the nature of
network industries, such as railroads, telecommuni-
cations, software and hardware networks. We will
see how network companies benefit from positive
feedback on both the demand side and supply side.
On the demand side, the more customers join a net-
work, such as a telecommunications service, the
higher the incentive for other customers to join. On
the supply side, the larger a network becomes in
terms of users and also in size of assets deployed, the
easier it is for a company to lower costs and prices.
The lower the price introduced by a network com-
pany, the more subscribers will join the network and
positive feedback kicks in. The result is a positive
spiral. The importance of critical mass, competition
and standards is discussed in the light of the dynam-
ics of positive feedback.
The Old World: economies of scale and scope
In the Old World of the industrial economy, firms
seeking market power could do so by virtue of barri-
ers of entry created by economies of scale. Saloner
et al. (2001, p. 138) identify three types of entry
barriers: barriers from production or distribution
technology, barriers from brand name or reputation,
and legal barriers. The first two are essentially cost
barriers in that replication of the incumbent’s assets
is inhibited by the costs of so doing. The third type
is an absolute barrier that arises from institutional
characteristics.
Diversified firms required an additional force:
economies of scope. These are defined as ‘the cost
savings realised when two different products are
produced within the same organisation rather than
at separate organisations’ (Saloner et al., 2001, p.
364). The products would share a common input
such as plant or equipment, obtaining volume dis-
counts on purchases, or applying common expertise
or reputation. In such a situation, where competi-
tion is monopolistic (or imperfect) producers may
attempt to shape customer preferences. They may
succeed in modifying the demand function to
become downward sloping in the conventional
manner and producers can then price according to
the nature of their marginal cost curves and the
price elasticities in the market. However, demand
and supply are mediated through a market mecha-
nism in which product demand is independent of
other products and demand is not time dependent.
This exaggerates the point, as we will see later when
we discuss product complementarity.
There is a class of markets and industries that do
not conform with the assumptions of the Old
World. These are the network industries. In this dis-
cussion the terms ‘industry’ and ‘market’ are used as
if interchangeable. 
The New World of network industries
The concept of network can be segmented into real
and virtual networks (Shapiro and Varian, 1999).
Real networks are found in industries such as
telephony and railways where a physical network is
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FIGURE 7: The value web.
present. Virtual networks are typified by computer
and software platforms where the interconnection
between users is intangible. The two types of net-
works are discussed below.
In real networks the interconnection between
users is tangible. Examples are cable networks for
telephone users and radio transmissions in mobile
phones. Electricity grids, telecommunications net-
works encompassing telephones, fax machines,
online services, and the Internet, are typical exam-
ples of products or services within real networks.
There are one-way networks such as broadcast tel-
evision where information flows in one direction
only. In two-way networks, such as railroads and
telephone systems, links are operated in both direc-
tions. Any network may be viewed as a set of
connections (links) between nodes. A two-way
network allows the links to be operated in both
directions whereas a one-way network has specific
direction. Two-way networks include railroads and
telephone systems. 
Figure 8 shows a simple star network where A
can communicate with B through a switch S. B
can also communicate with A by reversing the
direction of the link (viz. a telephone call). In
Figure 8 we have eight nodes (A through G)
linked through a switch S. If this were a two-way-
network AB and BA would be distinct products
(different telephone calls, different rail journeys).
The total number of products in the network
would be 56, i.e. n(n – 1) where n = the number of
nodes. If there were to be a ninth member (the
dotted lines to I in Figure 8) this would increase
the total number of products to 72 (n is now 9), a
total increase of 16 products available from the
expanded network. If the value to each user of
being in the network is proportional to the num-
ber of users, then the value of this network has just
increased by 28.5% (16 as a percentage of 56)
even though the size of the network has increased
by only 12.5% (one added to eight). This is an
algebraic characteristic of network economies of
scale that the value rises disproportionately higher
than the increase in network size as long as prices are
constant and products are independent.
Intuitively we might expect that an increase in
network size beyond a certain point has little
value. (Using calculus we would expect the first
derivative to be positive but the second derivative
to be negative. Therefore total value increases but
at a decreasing rate.) If this network were a one-
way network there would be half the number of
products but the value of the network would
nevertheless increase at the same rate but achiev-
ing only half the value. 
In virtual networks the interconnections
between users are intangible, but users remain inter-
dependent. Computer systems are typical of virtual
networks. For example, Mac users are part of the
Mac network, with Apple as the sponsor of the net-
work. Mac users are locked into a network
determined by the technology standard of this plat-
form. They can only use software that is compatible
to the system and will exchange files with users
within the system. Operating systems such as
Windows and Unix are other examples of virtual
networks. Virtual network dynamics also operate in
the entertainment industry for Sony Playstation,
Microsoft Xbox and Nintendo’s Gamecube net-
works.
Network size is still important in virtual net-
works in that a large consumer base makes
production viable and usage possible. In addition,
the value of a product increases as the number of, or
the variety of, the complementary goods or services
increases. Indirect network effects in the computer
industry are referred to as the hardware–software
paradigm. The success of an operating system for
personal computers depends on the variety of soft-
ware applications available in the market. Value
may depend more critically on software applica-
tions.
Network externalities: the new economic forces
Earlier in the paper we have looked at the tradi-
tional economic model for the ‘Old World’ which
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FIGURE 8: A two-way network.
was driven by economies of scale and scope. The
‘New World’, characterised by information and
communications technology is governed by a differ-
ent dynamic. Network externalities are the new
drivers of the network economy. It is important to
recognise that economies of scale/scope and net-
work externalities represent the extreme ends of a
spectrum of effects, and that the presence of one
does not imply the exclusion of the other.
Companies may experience the effects of both to
varying degrees, with a tendency for network exter-
nalities to have more strategic relevance in the new
network economy. 
The concept of network externalities has
attracted the attention of academics and practition-
ers alike. The extent to which network industries
have proliferated in the economy is a recent phe-
nomenon. The effects of network externalities,
however, have been recognised for some time with
the development of the older network companies
such as the railroads and the electricity systems. (In
1804 Trevithick constructed the first practical loco-
motive in England. In 1882 the Edison Electric
Lighting Company completed the first commercial
generating station at Holborn Viaduct in London.
The first commercial telephone line was installed in
Boston, Massachusetts in 1877.) 
Network externalities are defined as the increas-
ing utility that a user derives from consumption of a
product as the number of other users who consume
the same product increases (Katz and Shapiro,
1985). For example, the more people there are in a
telephone network the more users can be reached
on the network, thereby increasing its usability. Fax
machines, broadcast industry services, credit card
networks, and computer hardware and software are
examples of products exhibiting network externali-
ties.
According to Economides and Flyer (1997):
The value of nearly every good is influenced by
aggregate consumption levels in its market and
in the markets for related goods. In many cases,
high aggregate consumption in its own market,
and in the markets for complementary goods
affects positively the value of a good.
Traditionally such effects have been called net-
work externalities, since they were first
identified in network industries. While such
effects are salient in some markets, such as for
telephones, fax machines and computer operat-
ing systems, for most goods these influences are
more subtle and tend to be smaller.
Complementarity in network products
An important element is the notion of complemen-
tarity; thus the value of a railway station is derived
from the existence of other railway stations on the
network. A weaker definition relies also on comple-
mentarity between products (or nodes, in network
language) but allows the links to be created by the
customer rather than for the customer. Economides
and Flyer (1997) have some powerful examples:
... the value of a washing machine is affected by
the aggregate consumption of washing machines
and the consumption level of the particular
brand, since this determines the availability of
parts, repairmen, detergents, fabric softeners and
various other related goods and services. The
value of a sporting event is influenced by the
aggregate size of the audience, as this enhances
the excitement level, analysis, discussion and
remembrance of the event. Even a grapefruit is
influenced by network externalities, since the
variety of accessible complements, such as peel-
er, slicers, juicers, recipes, nutritional
information and specialised spoons, are affected
by the aggregate consumption of the fruit.
The essence of this idea is that the demand for a
product is influenced by total demand for the prod-
uct class or by total demand in a complementary
product class. Thus demand is conditioned by a
consumer externality. Where these consumer exter-
nalities are powerful, the feedback effect on demand
is such that there is a tendency towards a single net-
work, or platform, or standard. The value for
consumers of being on a common standard out-
weighs any specific differences between alternative
standards. We see that the VHS video-recording
standard was preferred to a ‘technically better’
Betamax rival to the extent that the rival standard
disappeared. The Wintel standard is greatly pre-
ferred to the Apple standard and the rival exists
only as a small niche in the market. Where the
externality is smaller and the intrinsic difference
between standards is relatively larger then we might
observe multiple competing and coexisting ‘plat-
forms’. (To observe multiple standards defies
common sense, hence the term ‘platform’ which
denotes an array of linked complementary products
that together are compatible with other products.)
An example of a platform can be seen in the auto-
mobile industry where a company might develop a
core of components and sub-assemblies that can be
used to support alternative body styling to create a
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product range. Such a platform can coexist with
other platforms because the scale efficiencies associ-
ated with platforms are modest in relation to market
size.
The analysis of complementarity is equivalent to
the analysis of a one-way network. Figure 8 can be
extended as in Figure 9 to show a typical one-way
network. Here we can interpret the Ai as automatic
teller machines (ATMs) and the Bj as banks. The 
network runs only from A to B, i.e. the two switches
have only one link. This means that there is compat-
ibility between all ATMs and all banks. This
maximises the value of the network but increases the
competition between banks for customers through
ATMs. (Two complementary components A and B
are compatible when they can be combined to pro-
duce a composite good. A VHS player is compatible
with VHS tapes. Two substitute components A1 and
A2 are compatible when each of them can be com-
bined with a complementary good B to produce a
composite good. Thus two VHS tapes are compati-
ble, and two VHS players are compatible.) It is this
compatibility that makes the complementarity actu-
al and the network operational. For complex
products actual complementarity has to be achieved
through adherence to specific technical standards.
Other complementary products can be visualised in
terms of Figure 9. VHS tapes could be the Ai and
VHS players could be the Bj. Think also of copier
paper and copiers, or printer paper and printers, or
car accessories and cars, or local and long distance
telephone networks. 
Networks were originally analysed on the assump-
tion that each network was owned by a single firm
and research concentrated on the efficient use of the
network structure and on the appropriate allocation
of costs (Economides, 1996; Sharkey, 1993). With
the anti-trust cases against AT&T and its later break-
up, attention shifted towards economies of scope, the
efficiency gains from joint operation of complemen-
tary components of networks (Baumol et al., 1982).
This led to issues of interconnection and compatibil-
ity in parallel with the reduced role of IBM in the
1980s and 1990s in the setting of technical standards
in computer hardware and software. As technology
has advanced, there have been significant reductions
in telecommunications costs and a shift towards frag-
mented ownership of telecommunications networks.
Market structure has shifted from natural monopoly
to oligopoly. Similar trends are evident in other IT-
intensive industries. Thus, the focus of interest in
network economics has shifted from the analysis of
natural monopoly towards issues of interconnection,
compatibility, interoperability and coordination of
quality. 
Network externalities and the battle for critical
mass
For normal goods, the demand curve slopes down-
wards. As price decreases, more of the product is
demanded. Other elements in the demand function
such as income or advertising serve as ‘demand
shifters’ and would elevate the demand to a higher
level. Figure 10 illustrates the traditional role of a
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FIGURE 9: A one-way network.
demand shifter. Higher levels of consumption are
derived from higher incomes (positive income elas-
ticities) or from lower prices (negative price
elasticities).
This fundamental relationship is greatly distort-
ed in the presence of network externalities. In the
presence of network externalities, we specify that
sales rise as accumulated sales (the installed base)
rise and we obtain a chicken and egg paradox.
Customers may not be interested in purchasing
because the installed base is small and/or not
expected to grow. Imagine the purchase of complex
software without Internet support, help lines and
user groups. Alternatively, there may be confident
expectations that the installed base will grow sub-
stantially and therefore consumers will confidently
make purchases. The paradox is that consumers will
not buy if the installed base is too low. However, the
installed base is too low because customers will not
buy. The crux of the paradox lies in the manage-
ment of expectations (see the second paper in this
series). In markets for normal goods, equilibrium is
explained in terms of a balance between costs and
demand, between marginal costs and marginal util-
ity. In network markets, there is also equilibrium to
be struck between actual demand and expectations
of total demand. 
This gives rise to an economic paradox. Almost
the first law of economics is that value comes from
scarcity. However, in the New World economy
value comes from plenty: the more something is
demanded and the more it is expected to be
demanded then the more valuable it becomes.
Expectations are so important in driving demand
that a point exists where the momentum is so over-
whelming that success becomes a runaway event
and we observe a ‘winner takes all’ phenomenon. 
The ‘tipping point’ is when the installed base (or
size of network) tips expectations sharply towards
one player (or one network) and away from its rival.
We have experienced this effect when we moved
towards Windows as our prevailing computer oper-
ating system, rather than OS2. Another example of
tipping would be IBM-compatibles versus Apple as
shown in Figure 12.
The exception to the winner takes all phenome-
non would be a regulated network market with
strong interconnections between competing plat-
forms. The mobile telephone industry is a classic
example. The standards are harmonised across the
network providers, at least by continental region.
The platforms are interlinked and the sales curves
of the regulated network providers follow the pat-
tern of the overall subscription curve for the
industry. 
Traditional economic thinking is based on nega-
tive feedback systems in which the strong get
weaker at the margin and the weak get stronger,
thus providing a drive towards a competitive equi-
librium. This is captured in economics by the
concept of diminishing marginal utility as con-
sumption grows. In the New World of networks,
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FIGURE: 10: Demand shifts due to the installed base.
Price
Quantity
D/installed base (t  )
D/installed base (t  )
extra value from
positive feedback rules. In this world the valuation
of a product increases the more that others consume
the product. Strictly speaking, it arises from the
interdependence of consumer decisions whereas
diminishing marginal utility dominates when con-
sumer decisions are independent – the normal
assumption in economics.
The price–quantity relationship is normally held
to be downward sloping, but the demand curve for a
network product should be drawn differently
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FIGURE 11: Winner takes all.
FIGURE 12: Market share of IBM and Apple.
(Figure 13). The value to the consumer of a net-
work product is reflected in the price he is willing to
pay – the vertical axis. The principal driver of value
is the size of the network, also referred to as the
installed base, and is shown on the horizontal axis.
Quantity demanded does still have an effect on
price but for these products, this is secondary to the
network effect. 
The initial upward slope of the curve reflects a
rising valuation at the margin, as consumers per-
ceive that they gain value by virtue of other
consumers having the product. Being on the Wintel
standard gives value to new users. However, as the
network grows, the extra consumers at the margin
are less valuable – i.e. this shape assumes that those
users with higher potential valuation of the net-
work will join first. As the network gets very large,
further growth has less value for future customers.
The intercept on the vertical axis represents the
value the network product has as a stand-alone
product. Thus a Wintel computer has some stand-
alone value, but a telephone has no value on its
own and is a pure network good.
There is a notion of an optimal size of a net-
work. This can be seen from the interaction of
demand and cost so that as less and less valuable
customers join the network there may come a
point where the costs of acquiring and servicing
new customers begins to exceed the price those
customers are willing to pay. This determines the
optimal size and has significant implications for
competition.
The three configurations shown in Figure 14
indicate the range of possibilities. The first is a pure
network good, such as a telephone system, in which
the optimal size of network is a very high proportion
of the available market. This implies there is little
or no room for rival networks. The second is a prod-
uct with a significant intrinsic value that attracts a
modest size group of users. For example, this could
be a corporate software package (e.g. enterprise
solutions) that attracts dedicated user support from
the supplier through the web. Alternative networks
could coexist. The third case is one of very high
intrinsic demand but extensive consumer interac-
tions (small in size but several in number) provide a
substantial total network value. The obvious exam-
ple is word processing software where the value
from standardising on MS Word is very high with
the result that alternative standards (such as
WordPerfect) are being frozen out of the market
even though the intrinsic value of any word pro-
cessing package is high.
Networks, standards and competition
According to Economides and Flyer (1997):
Firms that compete in markets where network
externalities are present face unique trade-offs
regarding the choice of a technical standard.
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FIGURE 13: The network demand curve. The idea of optimal size (OS).
Adhering to a leading compatibility standard
allows a firm’s product to capture the value
added by a large network. However, simultane-
ously the firm loses direct control over the
market supply of the good and faces (direct)
intra-platform competition. Alternatively,
adhering to a unique standard allows the firm to
face less or no intra-platform competition, but it
sacrifices the added value associated with a large
network.
This trade-off is a key strategic decision that
depends in part on the control that firms have in
making their output compatible with competitors’
outputs and complementary products. The ability
to conform to a common standard opens the oppor-
tunity to make this trade-off. Where standards are
proprietary, the decision rests with the owner of the
standard. The owner’s trade-off is the pay-off associ-
ated with developing the existing network and its
spillovers versus the introduction of more intra-
platform competition. Essentially the trade-off is
the same: to adhere to a common standard or to
seek uniqueness. This can be expressed as a sequen-
tial game: at the outset, one chooses the appropriate
technical standard (and, therefore, the network to
join), and later one chooses how to compete.
Normal markets do not have this choice of network
and there are consequences for market structure
and competition of the presence of network exter-
nalities. The mathematical model in Economides
and Flyer (1997) defines networks as coalition
structures and analyses the stability of coalitions
under different standards regimes and varying levels
of network externalities. There are a number of
implications for market structure in the presence of
network externalities.
First, it is intuitively clear that industry output
will be higher when there are network externalities
and when standards are open. Firms are free to
choose which standard to adopt and are deterred
only by the costs of adoption. Second, when stan-
dards are incompatible and the owners of standards
can exercise proprietary control, then incumbents
are more strongly protected against the conse-
quences of new entrants. Moreover, there will
usually be considerable asymmetries between firms
in terms of outputs, prices, and profits. (Under
incompatibility regimes firms are equivalent to plat-
forms and constitute one firm networks.) For pure
network goods the asymmetries are particularly
marked.
In general, with total incompatibility of stan-
dards, market concentration, output inequality and
price and profit inequality increase with the extent
of the network externality. This is an important
result because it explains why network industries
are so often dominated by one or two firms. The
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FIGURE 14: Alternative network demand configurations.
mechanism is straightforward. The leading network
establishes its critical mass, leaving the second net-
work to establish a critical mass across the
remaining untapped market coverage. The third
network follows in the same fashion and so on. It
follows that there will be a tendency to provide
large incentives to organise customers into few plat-
forms so as to maximise the added value from the
available networks. Firms will be keen to abandon
their own weak standards in favour of the higher
value obtainable from a leading network. 
There is a third implication. Where there are
proprietary standards and strong network effects
there is no natural equilibrium in terms of network
offerings. There are always incentives for at least
one firm to move to a stronger network and the
consequences of any one move is to shift the incen-
tives for all other firms. However, equilibrium can
be reinforced by the refusal of firms to make their
proprietary standards available. Again, the mecha-
nism is straightforward. Under strong externalities,
the owner of a standard has a considerable incen-
tive to exploit the standard by itself and to exclude
other firms with weaker standards. Conversely,
where the externality is weak, the owner will find a
stronger incentive to admit other firms to its propri-
etary standard in order to grow the network through
collective effort and thus generate more added
value.
In summary, strong network externalities suggest
the following conclusions:
1. Larger industry output.
2. Very large asymmetries between firms/platforms.
3. Likelihood of market dominance.
4. Enhancement and protection of proprietary
standards.
5. Equilibrium market structures that are the
reverse of the world without network externali-
ties.
This suggests some rules that govern the new econ-
omy.
1. The information economy depends on connec-
tivity. Without connectivity, consumer
interdependence is indirect. Positive feedback
gives an economic law of plenty – more gives
more.
2. The competition between rival networks/stan-
dards can be hard to call in advance.
Management of expectations is key and ‘tippy
markets’ are common. 
3. Commonly this is a game where the upfront
costs are very large and the revenues are substan-
tially delayed and are significantly at risk.
4. As a result, this is a ‘winner takes all’ world.
5. It is also a world of immense uncertainty where
even the range of potential outcomes is not
known but also where there is a significant prob-
ability that future technological change might
undermine an apparently winning position.
6. There is a law of inverse pricing. The best (i.e.
the most valuable in the future) products are
given away, such as web browsers, in order to
create a consumer standard, and sheer volume
causes both marginal costs and prices to fall over
time as the product becomes more valuable. The
cash flow machine is modest (even small) mar-
gins multiplied by gigantic volumes to defray
massive investments. The machine is volume
driven and protected by very large switching
costs.
7. Open standards are the key to volume. Protected
standards are only viable as small high-priced
niche markets.
8. The first strategic choice is what network to
join. The second, and a long way behind, is how
to compete within the network of choice.
A new set of strategies are emerging to offset the
risks and pressures exerted by the rules listed above.
This is visible in the setting up of global standards
and their ensuing platforms. For example, Group
Speciale Mobile, commonly known as GSM, is an
association of 600 network operators and suppliers
of the mobile phone industry. Their primary objec-
tive is to set a common standard for mobile
communications in order to create a homogeneous
industry where equipment, software and networks
can seamlessly talk to each other. Strategies of stan-
dardisation are stabilising the markets and charting
the course for research and development policies. 
Conclusion
This paper establishes two propositions. First, the
supply of knowledge has a distinctive cost structure
that makes large volumes extremely important. As
(globalising) markets have grown, so has specialisa-
tion in the production of knowledge with
consequences for companies in terms of outsourcing
of activities and for new, more focused approaches
to their own knowledge base and to the acquisition
of knowledge from outside. This has led to three
new, distinctive business models:
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1. The new competitor who uses new, typically
electronic channels to challenge existing busi-
nesses and to engineer new economies of scope
which have the effect of transforming (poten-
tially) the wider competitive landscape.
2. The deconstruction model in which the value
chain is slimmed down to those elements in
which clear advantage is evident. Control over
the entire supply chain, and therefore profitabil-
ity, depends on the location of the most
significant knowledge components in the supply
chain.
3. The reconstruction model builds on deconstruc-
tion but the knowledge assets are deployed into
adjacent and apparently unrelated supply chains
with the effect of transferring knowledge and
(potentially) controlling these supply chains.
These economic characteristics of knowledge are
dependent in large part on the interconnectivity
that is characteristic of the technologies of informa-
tion goods. Interconnectivity allows customers to
view, use and link products, giving rise to virtual
networks of customers. In these networks, powerful
demand-side increasing returns can operate, giving
rise to our second proposition. Where consumer-
based externalities are powerful there are strong
pressures towards ‘winner takes all’ phenomena
(e.g. Wintel globally, and Sky TV in the UK). In
these circumstances conventional economic laws
are challenged. De facto monopoly can emerge: but
uncertainty is high and markets may be intrinsical-
ly unstable. Successive waves of technology may
outmode old monopolies and serve as the basis for
new monopolies.
In our second companion paper we argue that
there are significant implications for firms arising
from both of these propositions. In particular, col-
laboration between firms becomes almost essential,
requiring a complex balance to be struck between
collaboration and competition.
References
Arthur WB (1989) Competing technologies, increasing
returns, and lock-in by historical events. Economic Journal
99: 116–31.
Arthur WB (1990) Positive feedback in the economy. Scientific
American 262: 92–9. 
Baumol W, Panzar J, Willig R (1982) Contestable markets and
the theory of industry. American Economic Review 72.
DiMaggio PJ, Powell WW (1983) The iron cage revisited:
institutional isomorphism and collective rationality in
organizational fields. American Sociological Review
48(April): 147–60.
Dumont B (2000) Book Review: Carl Shapiro and Hal R.
Varian, Information Rules: A Strategic Guide to the
Network Economy. Journal of Network Industries.
Economides N (1996) The economics of networks.
International Journal of Industrial Organization 14(2):
675–99.
Economides N, Flyer F (1997) Compatibility and Market
Structure for Network Goods. Discussion Paper EC-98-02,
Stern School of Business, NYU.
Evans P, Wurster TS (2000) Blown to Bits. Boston, MA:
Harvard Business School Press.
Hawley A (1968) Human ecology. In: Sills DL (ed)
International Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences, pp 328–37.
New York: Macmillan.
Katz M, Shapiro C (1985) Network externalities, competition
and compatibility. American Economic Review 75(3):
424–40.
Kelly K 1994) Out of Control – The New Biology of Machines.
Addison Wesley.
Quinn JB (2001) Services and Technology, Revolutionizing
Economics, Business and Education. Darmond College.
Saloner G, Shepard A, Podolny J (2001) Strategic Management.
New York: Wiley. 
Shapiro C, Varian H (1999) Information Rules: A Strategic
Guide to the Network Economy, p 2. Boston, MA: Harvard
Business School Press.
Sharkey NE, Sharkey AJC (1993) Adaptive generalisation and
the transfer of knowledge. Artificial Intelligence Review:
Special Issue on Connectionism 7: 313–28.
Address for correspondence: John McGee, BA (Econ)
Manchester) PhD (Stanford), Professor of Strategic
Management, and Academic Director, Full Time MBA
Programme, Warwick Business School, University of Warwick,
Coventry CV4 7AL, United Kingdom
E-mail: J.McGee@WBS.ac.uk
EUROPEAN BUSINESS JOURNAL 132
View publication stats
